JULIUSZ MIEROSZEWSKI
Over the last several years, I have written here about German “Ostpolitik” and American “Ostpolitik.” Now it is worth considering Polish “Ostpolitik”—especially as the Polish People’s Republic neither has, nor can have an Eastern program.
A series of articles on this subject have recently appeared in London’s “Dziennik Polski” and “Myśl Polska”, proving that while Poles are unanimous regarding the border on the Odra and Nysa rivers, there are some major differences in Polish public opinion regarding the issues of both the eastern border and the Eastern program.
Two thoughts to begin with.
Is there any point in deliberating the Polish Eastern program? Is it not too early for that? We do not know how long the present state of affairs will continue. One thing is, however, certain: as soon as the situation in East Europe begins to change, Poles will be able to influence the course of events only if they have an agreed Eastern program.
I have always been highly distrustful of monothematic attitudes (consolidated, strong, prepared). Russia, however, is enough of a super-problem from the Polish political perspective that, as a nation, we cannot afford to have 5 or 6 different Eastern programs. In this special case, the wise principle of “playing two pianos” should apply to tactics, not core principles. We must also bear in mind that Eastern politics are not only about Russia, but also about the nations under Russia’s yoke.
In a moment of crisis and turmoil, the Soviet government may disavow Stalinism and revoke the seizures effected by Stalin and Hitler. By restoring Poland’s borders of 1939, Russia would count on causing conflict between Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, which would not only enable the creation of a common front but even engender a “commonality of interests” between Moscow and Warsaw–a union based on the restoration of the 1939 border.
Russia has decided that Poles will help it maintain and solidify the empire within the pre-war borders with enthusiasm and, above all, they will help retain the Ukrainian granary for Moscow.
The Eastern program must provide an answer to the question of how we should behave in the situation described above, which may take place.
And the second thought. I am not listing names–which are easy to decipher for anyone who will take the time to browse the relevant issues of “Dziennik Polski” and “Myśl Polska”. I am not giving names because this is not about yet another personal polemic in the press. “Myśl Polska” represents more than the opinions of its individual authors. The magazine is an institution of the National Party, which is both a Polish political party and a major force in the diaspora and in Poland.
*
I have no intention of entering into a discussion with people whose Eastern program consists of emotions, complexes, and prejudices. Those who proclaim that everything that is Russian is evil and despicable are problems for psychiatrists, not politicians.
Fortunately, the vast majority of Poles realise that we must reach an agreement with Russia in our own interest. Roman Dmowski also understood this but he did not predict the problems of nationality or the social transformation that was about to take place in Russia. He only thought of alignment with the tzar’s establishment.
Dmowski's original error can also be found in the reasoning of contemporary National Party politicians who understand Russia as the Soviet Union, just as Dmowski understood Russia as the tsarist empire.
The widely known Open Letter to Khrushchev (“Horyzonty” issue 43, 1959)–as well as the text of the letter’s author, titled Poland Between America, Germany, China, and Russia (“Myśl Polska” of 1 March 1973)–provides a good illustration of the replication of Dmowski’s error of over half a century ago.
The error stems from two false premises: first, that one should seek agreement not with the Russian nation and society but with the establishment, and second, from the conviction—so demeaning for the Russians—that totalitarianism and imperialism are a permanent phenomenon in Russia so one has to speak with the tzars or Khrushchevs because there will never be a democratic government in Moscow.
Political writers from the National Party mostly agree with the view that the Soviet Union is “doomed to imperialism” because any liberalisation would threaten the empire’s integrity. If the tiny Czechoslovakia had been allowed to implement democratic reforms in 1968, it would be difficult to resist the analogous demands of Poles and Ukrainians of whom there are 75 million.
We have always emphasised in Kultura that revisionists in satellite countries should seek contacts and connections with the opposition in Russia itself. In my books I have pointed to the example of India. In order to yield the desired fruit, evolution had to progress not only in India but also in the United Kingdom. The Indians realised this perfectly well, and for many years they struggled in England to change the views not of the Indians but the British.
History provides ample evidence that there can be no discussion with autocratic imperialism about independence and self-determination simply because there can neither be democracy inside, nor outward liberalism within, the framework of autocratic imperialism. The Soviet government cannot offer Poland independence for the same reasons it cannot offer democracy to the Russian nation.
We are not making a choice between a so-called “Promethean” program and a program of talks with the Soviets–because we have no such choice. We are in favour of a program for the liberation of nations under the Russian yoke–not out of romanticism but because, as a matter of fact, there is not, and never has been, another way for us.
A castaway on a desert island waving his handkerchief in the hope of being noticed by a ship or aeroplane is certainly a romantic and pathetic figure. But the castaway pursues the only realistic policy remaining at his disposal because he has no other option.
Not all that is noble and romantic has to be unrealistic. Necessity is a test and a criterion of realism–the necessity of saving one’s life or the necessity of salvaging national independence. In a fire, people sometimes jump from the third floor because such a decision is essential and is the only option in terms of the degree of its realism. Necessity can be defined as the absence of choice. The only way is necessary, and hence realistic, because there is no other way.
Four orientations regarding the Polish Eastern politics can be identified among the diaspora:
Most national democrats concur with the view, expressed many times by the Party’s publicists, that the Promethean program should be banished as a fiction, and one should trust that a time will come when Russia gets to see its own state interest in a reliable agreement with Poland. The same writers who promote this view also claim that the Soviets cannot loosen the reins of the satellite states because that would lead to a disintegration of the Soviet Union. The same columnists also claim that nationalism is on the rise among non-Russian nations who make up half of the total population of the Soviet Union. From this, the same authors draw the conclusion that the nationality issue in the Soviet is a different thing altogether than it was in Lenin’s time.
Let us begin by reviewing the National Party’s Eastern program. What I find the most dangerous is its core tenet, which states that agreement should be sought with the Russian establishment regardless of its socio-political overtones.
The communists are also seeking an arrangement with the Russian establishment. The writer in Horyzonty I have mentioned before has written an open letter to Khrushchev. Alexander Dubček, as we know now, wrote desperate letters to Brezhnev up until the last moments before the invasion.
I am not even mentioning the fact that the above tactics reduce the independence-driven National Party to the status of a neo-Pax that is not yet endorsed. What is more important is the answer to the question of why initiatives of this kind cannot bring favourable results.
Dubček was not an emigrant from Horyzonty but a tried-and-tested communist who was supported by an authentic majority of Czechoslovak society, yet he achieved nothing. Why?
An answer to the above dilemma has come from a prominent writer of the National Party who has not written letters to Khrushchev. Here is what he wrote:
“The sense of separateness of the non-Russian nations is not weakening, it is definitely stronger than it was half a century ago when the Soviet Union was established. During the last few months we have had a demonstration in Lithuania, ferment among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and a change of government in Georgia. This internal pressure in the Soviet has a twofold effect. First, it prevents liberalisation of the political system, gives the masses more say, and justifies the need for the Russian party’s dictatorship in the eyes of the imperial nationality. This also affects the policy towards the satellites, it provokes harsher reactions to liberal trends–as in Czechoslovakia–as well as strict control over the subordinated communist governments. It is unreasonable to count on basic democracy in the Soviets. Russians cannot afford it, for fear that the Soviet Union will fall apart on them” (Myśl Polska, 1 I 1973).
From a purely pragmatic standpoint and rejecting all ideologies and party doctrines, it should be stated that demanding independence for Poland from the Soviet Union is absurd because the Soviets cannot do it if they want to be the Soviet Union. There are quite a few nations that are candidates for independence in the Soviet Union, and if Moscow granted independence to any one of them, the Soviet Union would–as the quoted author writes–fall apart. Imperial totalitarianism can only be maintained using imperialist totalitarian methods. When imperial methods end, so does imperialism.
We fully agree with the fragment of the Myśl Polska article I have quoted above. Even so, the author of the text is bound by the doctrine of his party and prefers to contradict himself rather than draw logical conclusions from his own text.
If we posit that the Soviet Union cannot afford any kind of liberalisation because it would fall apart, it is obvious that no talks with the Soviet Union could improve Poland’s situation. If that is the case, we must link our actions and hopes to those nations which, like the Poles, aim for independence even when they know that they will not negotiate that independence from the Soviet government.
Let us imagine, for example, that Russia is homogenous in terms of nationality. The immeasurable expanse from Vladivostok to Lviv is inhabited by a congruous mass of native Russians. Under such circumstances Poland’s situation would be hopeless. We would dissolve like a pinch of salt in the Russian ocean.
Fortunately, that is not the case. Russia is not nationally homogenous, and Poles are not alone. Our only chance is to connect with others who, like us, would wish to free themselves and define their own fate. The author of the article discussed here, however, rejects this only chance. He does so even though, as he writes, “the non-Russian nations’ sense of separateness is not weakening, and it is certainly stronger today than it was half a century ago.”
Followers of political doctrines always make a certain basic mistake. Having been dead for 34 years, Dmowski cannot change anything in his political philosophy and it would be unfair to blame him for his views not fitting the present situation. It is the duty of his descendants who are alive now to adapt the National Party’s political doctrine to the requirements of reality.
For example, everything that Dmowski wrote about the Jewish issue has become irrelevant because there are but a few thousand Jews in Poland in 1973.
No one diminishes the authors of political doctrines as much as their “later-years grandchildren”, as they represent leaders with views from decades ago, which those leaders would never voice if they were alive now.
Dmowski proclaimed that the Polish issue should be linked to the historical currents of the era. There is no doubt that the liberation program and striving towards national self-determination are among the main currents of our age. Only one idea has survived on the graveyard of ideas and ideologies from the second half of the 20th century: that idea is nationalism.
All things considered, even the most eloquent National Democrat would not convince me that Dmowski, if he were still alive, would write letters to Khrushchev or Brezhnev; neither will anyone convince me that Dmowski, if he were still alive, would ignore the liberation movements among the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, or Belarussians and declare a readiness to reach an agreement with official Moscow at the expense of those nations. This is because Dmowski would realise that the Ukrainian problem is altogether a different thing now than it was 50 years ago and that it requires a reorientation of Polish politics.
But the mummification by the hands of the later-year grandchildren applies across the board. Not only Dmowski, but also Piłsudski was mummified, not to mention those international prophets–Marx and Lenin.
It is even more difficult to understand the “Ostpolitik” of the Pilsudski-ites and the so-called “castle”. Those gentlemen understand the Promethean program as the breaking up of the Soviet Union, rather than liberation politics for Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarussians. Reducing the Promethean program to a new version of Polish minority politics is the surest way to turn Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarussians into enemies of Poland.
In London one can always find a handful of Ukrainians who speak Polish far better than Ukrainian, who are ready to manifest not so much a Polish-Ukrainian friendship as a shared hatred for the Soviets.
If Ukrainians were to choose exclusively and strictly between a Polish and Soviet Lviv, a large portion of émigré Ukrainians would favour a Polish Lviv, assuming, of course, that Lviv was a part of a non-communist, democratic Poland.
A proper Promethean program, however, assumes a different alternative. We trust that Ukrainians will be given the choice between Lviv in an independent, democratic Poland and Lviv in independent, democratic Ukraine. In a situation like this there is no doubt that a vast majority of the Ukrainian nation would be in favour of Lviv in an independent Ukraine.
The National Democrats’ Eastern program is more consistent than that of the “castle camp”. The National Democrats reject the Promethean program, meaning that they believe that there is no causal relationship between Poland’s Eastern politics and the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus, or Lithuania. According to the National Democrats’ proposition, the Poles are the largest Slavic nation with a state and they should arrange their relationships on a bilateral basis. Of course, in seeking talks and agreements on a bilateral basis, one cannot support liberation movements because official Moscow will never engage in talks with sympathisers of Prometheism. The above view, as long as it sticks to the position of bilateral Polish-Russian talks, is logical, however disgusting. This is because it assumes that, given conducive conditions, Moscow will endorse our independence in exchange for Poland endorsing the perpetual enslavement of Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Lithuanians.
To this, the National Democrats will respond that political programs are not divided into those that are disgusting or sublime, but into those that are effective or ineffective. The objective of our politics is not to win independence for Ukraine or Lithuania but to ensure Poland's independent existence.
This is certainly true, and we have no intention of questioning the above arguments. It is not Poland’s duty to liberate Ukraine, and neither is it Ukraine’s responsibility to set Poland free.
The issue at hand, however, is different. Evaluation of the National Democrats’ Eastern politics depends solely on the answer to the question of whether the prospect of bilateral Polish-Russian talks, now or in the future, is realistic.
Over the last 200 years, rather than negotiate with us, Russia has participated in four partitions of Poland. This happened because Russia is and was an imperial power. An additional factor has been the fact that there has been a major mismatch of power between the two neighbouring states. Moscow does not have to consider us as a partner because it is capable of imposing vassal status on Poland.
Émigré propaganda indulges in plans of a Polish-Czechoslovak or a Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian confederation, aiming at establishing a bloc of states in Central and Eastern Europe whose combined economic and industrial potential would make such a confederation a serious candidate for a partner for Russia. Connected and confederated, we could politically counter Moscow’s imperialist appetites.
The problem is that Russia will not allow the implementation of federalist plans precisely because it is imperialistic. In other words, it is utterly naïve to expect that imperialist Russia will agree to any negotiations that aim to safeguard us from Russian imperialism. It is even more naïve to believe that imperial Russia will concede to talks aiming to deprive Moscow of the fruits and benefits of its imperial politics.
As long as Russia is the imperial colossus in its present borders, our chance of gaining independence from Moscow is nil. In order for Poland to regain independence, either of the following conditions must be realised: either Poland becomes stronger, or Russia becomes weaker. One way or another, the present disparity of power must change because as long as the mismatch of potentials exists, Poland’s situation is, bluntly speaking, hopeless.
We have neither a chance of conquering imperialist Russia nor of bargaining with it for the status of an independent partner.
If we consider Russian imperialism to be the principal, although not the only cause of the failures of Poland’s Eastern politics over the last 200 years, it begs the question of if and when Russia will cease being imperialistic.
In analogy to other powers, Russia will cease to be imperialists when it loses its empire. Speculating about when and under what conditions the Soviet empire will fall would be jejune. Suffice to say that in an era of growing national and liberation movements, the Soviet empire is becoming increasingly anachronistic, and more and more of a “singularity” in the 20th century.
Imperialist Russia is a threat to China. I am convinced that when China strengthens its industry and nuclear potential, it will adopt a more specific policy towards the Soviets. I think it will demand independence for the Baltic States and Ukraine in the international arena. In Beijing they realise full well that it is only through the nationality issue that the Soviet Union can be dismembered, and Russia can be reduced to its territorially proper proportions.
Some might say that we do not need an Eastern program as long as the Soviet empire exists. We will draw up such a program when the Soviet Union finds itself in a state of decomposition.
I disagree with such a view. A crisis in the Soviet Union, whatever form it takes, will create political conditions for the enslaved countries that it will be up to us to either use or waste. The chances of wasting possibly favourable conditions are very high exactly because no program has been agreed upon.
If I were a Russian imperialist, I would comfort myself with the supposition that it is unlikely, in a situation of war or major crisis, that the nations under the Soviet yoke would establish a common front–which would be a threat. I would think it more likely that Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians will be at each other’s throats as soon as they have even one hand free, which will enable Moscow to gain partial control over the situation.
Giving Lviv to Poland at some point would be a ridiculously low price if such a gesture would prevent an agreement between 33 million Poles and 44 million Ukrainians.
The Eastern program should not reach too far into the future or contemplate plans that may not be discussed before independence is regained. Considering how arduously the unification in the Western bloc is progressing, it would be imprudent to plan in emigration a federation or supra-state associations in the future Eastern Europe. Let us leave this to those who will live to see the day of liberation.
Our task–no small one at that, hopefully not a work of Sisyphus–is to clear the field of the horrible errors that enabled Russia to harness our nations. Poland and Ukraine cover an area of almost a million square kilometres, with a population of around 80 million. There are no objective reasons why 80 million Europeans inhabiting one of the richest areas of our continent should be deprived of the basic rights that citizens of Uganda or Tanzania enjoy.
The first point in Polish Eastern politics should be to endorse the right of self-determination and independent existence as a state of all nations under the Soviet yoke. From the Polish point of view, this point applies in particular to Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Lithuanians.
As the agreement and a unified front of the enslaved nations is the basic precondition for liquidation of Russian imperialism under favourable circumstances, we should assure Ukrainians and Lithuanians that not only are we are not putting forward claims to regain Vilnius and Lviv, but also that we will not make military advances to take those cities even if the circumstances were favourable for us.
Modern Poland is a nationally homogenous country. Poland does not need new cities or territories; what it needs is a modicum of independence. We cannot fight Soviet imperialism under the banners of Polish imperialism–Soviet national politics cannot be confronted with Polish nationality politics because the nations ruled consecutively by Poland and Russia now wish not for liberal nationality policies but for a right to self-determination.
We wish for friendly relationships with the Russian nation. In his article titled The Polish Issue in the April edition of Kultura, Leszek Kołakowski, who knows and understands communism from his own painful experience, wrote that “Sovietism deprives the Russians themselves of their motherland, of historical continuity, of their language as the bonding agent of national consciousness.”
We would also like to add that Soviet totalitarians make a holocaust sacrifice of Russian art and literature on the altar of possessive imperialism,, without which the Russian national culture is doomed to dwindle. Not only is there no contradiction in an attitude that is simultaneously pro-Russian and anti-Russian, true amiability for the Russian nation must, by definition, imply a negative attitude towards Sovietism. None of us believes that Gierek and his party constitute the government that Poles deserve. Only bottomless disdain could make one believe that, while Stalinists like Brezhnev or Gierek are an offence to Poles, they are good enough for Russians because Russians do not deserve any better.
We reemphasise that, in geopolitical terms, Poland is in a difficult, temporarily hopeless situation. That being said, we note that geopolitics is not only Russia but also Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus. Geopolitics make Poland a satellite state. Because of the same geopolitics, Russians are less than 50 per cent of the Soviet Union’s population. Geopolitics is, in fact, the Soviets’ Achilles’ heel, as they are placed between nationalist China and the hotbed of national movements in the Soviets and the satellite states.
Everything has gone out of date except nationalism. Not the 19th century, but the 20th century is the time of nationalisms. I am saying this without rejoicing because I have never been and never will be a nationalist yet we need to be able to tell the difference between defensive and possessive nationalism. I oppose violence, but it is obvious that a man assaulted by a bandit has the right to defend himself, even though defence is almost always defensive violence.
Likewise, even though I am an opponent of imperialist nationalism I believe that every nation has the right to defend itself, which is impossible without an amplified nationalist feeling. Nationalism becomes evil when it mutates into possessiveness—in other words, when one not only defends one's own but also reaches for what belongs to others.
We still have one proposition to comment on. Political writers of the National Party state as a fact that it is impossible to dismember the Soviets without war. Based on the above assurance they put forward the conclusion that the Promethean program is a pipe dream.
Napoleon was in Moscow, Hitler stood on the outskirts of Moscow, and in neither case was Russia dismembered. What, then, are the historic premises on which our opponents base their categoric conclusion that it is not possible to dismember Russia without war?
Personally, I suppose that the process of dismembering the Soviets or transforming them into a Commonwealth of Nations cannot begin in Washington or Beijing but must begin and mature within the Soviet empire itself. Only then can war act as a factor fostering liberation movements. A potential Russian-Chinese war, if it were to break out too early, would only account for a wasted opportunity from the point of view of liberation movements.
In the article titled Technologiczne pojmowanie dziejów (Kultura, 4/307/), I expressed the opinion that technology makes the strong super strong and the weak super weak. This view is fully supported by history. We were doomed to defeat because Hitler’s Reich produced 10 times as much steel as Poland. Based on this historical analogy, we conclude that the fact that the Soviets have nuclear weapons, which we do not have, determines the fact that war cannot be an option because it would have to end with our defeat.
For the sake of objectivism though, it must be emphasised that technology, and nuclear technology in particular, often turns speculations based on historical analogies to dust.
American experts believe that nuclear power plants will need to be developed extensively over the next 50 years due to the energy crisis. They also conclude that in the second half of the 21st century, technology will find ways to draw energy directly from sunlight and the oceans, as those are two enormous potential sources of natural energy that have not yet been utilised.
This, however, is a remote prospect. Nowadays, only nuclear power is available. Experts note that nuclear power plants represent different hazards, and not only for health. When a country is covered with hundreds of facilities of this kind the risk emerges that one day, a terrorist group will seize one of the nuclear power plants and will be able to dictate terms to Washington.
Preparing a crude atomic bomb is a relatively simple effort when the nuclear fuel is available. Accessing such material will become easier every year.
I have mentioned this to demonstrate that in modern times, speculations based on historical analogies often fail. In 1939, Gdynia was defended by the scythemen, as if they had been raised from the dead from the battlefield of Racławice. In the Poland of the time, the 19th century was coming to an end. But who can tell what weapons and bombs insurgents will use in Eastern Europe today?
Without indulging in prophecies, one should reemphasise that the Soviet empire is an anachronism in an age where nationality movements are gaining forces. Anachronisms sometimes linger a long time but they eventually always fall.
The task of Polish Eastern politics should be to incite and magnify all centrifugal forces in the Soviets, and to cement a common front of nations that have been harnessed by the Soviets–including the Russians.
I have long reconciled myself with the fact that I will probably not live to see the time of liberation. What I do regret is that, to this day, we are not prepared, that there is not full communion between Poles and Ukrainians, Belarussians and Lithuanians. I regret that there are politicians still among us who are willing to talk to imperialist Moscow above the heads and at the expense of the brotherly nations. I regret that there are fractions in exile consisting of honourable patriots who put the lifeless legalism of the 1939 borders above the imperative for unified action by the enslaved nations. I regret that so few Poles seek agreement and cooperation with the new Russian generation.
Allow me to say this once more: we will gain nothing from the political conditions we await unless we are thoroughly prepared.
Kultura 1973, no. 6/309
English translation by Piotr Sut
