JULIUSZ MIEROSZEWSKI
“The Americans do not need Russia for economic purposes. Even the difficult-to-
achieve exchange with the Soviets of five billion dollars per year amounts to no more than a
rounding error in America’s overall budget. The Americans need Russia’s help–and here lies
the paradox–for the successful liquidation of their global hegemony.”
That is the opinion of Wojciech Wasiutyński, who has lived in the United States for a
number of years and who certainly understands American politics better than the émigré
publicists who have not left London for the last 30 years.
We must rid ourselves of the schizophrenic attitude to the United States. America is
not and will never be the power that Poles have imagined it to be. Our refusal to acknowledge
America for what it actually is prevents us from exercising what little influence we do have in
the United States.
In the long term, propaganda dumbs down those who preach it, not those to whom it is
aimed. During the “cold war” we proclaimed complete alignment of Polish and American
interests so insistently and for so long that we now literally falsify reality to make it consistent
with the premises of outdated propaganda.
In the opinion of commentators in the émigré press, Nixon’s politics towards the
Soviets are a tactical gambit or pretence whose role is to obfuscate somewhat different
intentions of the United States.
The elder émigré publicists expressed the opinion that the Watergate scandal was
pumped up by communist propaganda. The Soviet press proposed a theory that Watergate was
pumped up by reactionaries opposing the policy of détente initiated by Nixon and Brezhnev.
But it has always been like this. In his recently published volume of Dzienniki, Lechoń
sings the praises of Eisenhower and believes that everything will change for the better now
that the Republican general right-winger has taken office in the White House.
Eisenhower was playing golf as Budapest was taking its last gasp. Likewise, in the
émigré press Nixon is not a living person and politician, but an effigy stuffed with Polish
wishful thinking.
Accurate reconnaissance is a key element of any politics. One has to be able to
recognise both an enemy and an ally correctly. False recognition of an ally can have equally
disastrous effects as false recognition of an enemy.
For us, unfortunately, analysis and reconnaissance are replaced by dancing to the tune
of others. Many émigré Poles display the same loyalty towards Nixon as Gierek and his press
showed towards Brezhnev. Just as the national press considers any criticism of Gierek’s
regime a capitalist ideological diversion, among those of us in exile, any criticism of Nixon is
likewise considered a work of communist inspiration.
Matters are complicated by the fact that Poles I know who visit communist Poland and
publish columns in Western magazines–which are often praised in the regime press– claim
that they are acting with the full support of the Americans.
So we have two extreme, even contradictory fractions of émigré Americophilia. Those
in the first camp proclaim that Watergate is pumped up by the liberals and communists in
order to harm Nixon. That the Soviet-American détente and rapprochement is a pretence. That
Nixon and all of America are actually filled with hatred for the Soviets, like at the peak of the
Cold War. Mobilisation of all anti-communist forces of the world is still, as before, the
principal goal of American politics, of which Nixon is a living symbol.
The second camp typically includes foreign Poles of the young and middle-aged
generation who have been educated abroad. Those gentlemen visit Poland, they write columns
in émigré and foreign magazines and are sometimes noticed, and even praised, by the regime
press. By so doing they believe that they are implementing the American-Soviet policies of
détente and coexistence.
It is beyond doubt that both Professor Pragier and Professor Bromke are sincerely pro-
American, even if they assign different content to their Americophilia. I value and respect
both of these men but I do not agree with either of them. It seems to me that Professors
Pragier and Bromke represent two fractions of the pro-Americanism we have discussed
above.
In my opinion, both professors erroneously interpret the key terms “coexistence” and
“détente”.
As a very rough summary, Professor Pragier believes that coexistence and détente
between the Soviets and America is impossible, and hence, détente cannot benefit Poland
either.
Professor Bromke, on the other hand, believes that it is worth a try. He believes that if
a Soviet-American détente does, after all, yield positive results, this will also have a beneficial
impact on Poland.
The error in the reasoning of both professors is that there is no analogy or causal
relationship between Poland and America. Contrary to what Professor Pragier believes,
détente between America and the Soviets is possible, and, contrary to the opinion of Professor
Bromke, a Soviet-American détente may deteriorate rather than improve Poland’s position.
America is the world’s greatest superpower and it can relax its relationships with Russia or
China because nothing threatens it from the outside, and, de facto, nothing can threaten it. If
Beijing or Moscow attacked the United States, they would be signing their own death
certificates.
Neither is forsaking hegemony the price for a détente as America does not crave
hegemony. Being the world’s policeman is more costly, and each new Congress is unwilling
to underwrite the required borrowing.
Over a period of 20 years, the Soviets have built the world’s second-largest navy. Then
again, neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev had to contend with the will or opinion of the Soviet
taxpayer.
The United States is entangled in a variety of economic troubles, which manifest in the
form of inflation and price surges. Having to choose between costly global hegemony and
prosperity without hegemony, the Americans will be sure to choose the latter.
As regards Prof. Bromke’s proposition, we need to note that even if the Helsinki
conference and the summit conference proposed by the Soviets were to result in some
concessions on the part of Moscow, the whole “détente” concept of Soviet politics, which was
explicated by Minister Gromyko on 10 July this year in Helsinki, is based on the West’s
acknowledgement and legalisation of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe.
To some extent it may seem strange that the Soviets are so very keen on the formal
legalisation of the status quo, which everyone passively and unanimously endorses. Everyone
except China, which does not recognise the border on the Odra and Nysa rivers or the seizure
of Lviv and Vilnius. Neither does it recognise the incorporation of the Baltic states into the
Soviet Union. In other words, China acknowledges neither the Soviet zone of influence in
Europe nor the post-war borders of the Soviet Union.
Moscow, therefore, does not want formal recognition of the status quo in Europe by
the Western powers as it cannot hope for its post-Yalta gains to be acknowledged by China,
which is also unwilling to cancel the Cold War against the Soviet Union. (A brochure recently
published in Beijing lies in front of me, titled Down with the new Tsars).
However, Soviet-Chinese relations, while directly linked to the European situation, are
not the subject of these deliberations.
In trying to rectify our attitude towards the West, we should begin by eradicating the
complex of dancing to the master’s tune. What is the complex about? Let us look at an
example. During Brezhnev’s recent visit to Washington, D.C., there was only one anti-Soviet
demonstration. The streets of the capital city of the United States saw peaceful yet expressive
demonstrations by Jews. It might seem that Poles have immeasurably more reasons to
demonstrate against the Soviets than the Jews. It is Poland, not Israel, that is a satellite of the
Soviets. Does the demonstration prove that Jews are less pro-American because Israel needs
the United States so very much?
Poles and Jews are pro-American, and both of them are anti-Soviet. However, only
Jews demonstrated because the complex of dancing to the master’s tune made it impossible
for the Poles to do so. Nixon didn’t want demonstrations, and who would oppose the
president? “We are standing by your side, Your Majesty, and to stand by your side, Your
Majesty, is what we desire”. A significant number of Poles are traditional loyalists, and they
believe that something can be achieved this way. Due to the lack of democratic traditions,
they do not understand that one can be honestly and enthusiastically pro-American and still
demonstrate against President Nixon’s Ostpolitik. Poles are used to believing that salaries,
pensions, and university posts depend on the mercy of the government and president, and they
fear that even the most peaceful and civilised demonstration against official policy could take
away their homes and livelihoods.
Loyalists in the Polish People’s Republic have reasons to believe that this is the case,
but in a democratic America, such loyalist philosophy is completely out of place.
That complex of dancing to America’s tune and faithfulness to the feudal
understanding of loyalism also provide a perfect environment for the activity of the regime. If
the president cordially welcomes Brezhnev, if the president visits Gierek in Warsaw, then a
demonstration of a critical attitude towards the “détente” risks a charge of disloyalty. And
belonging to the Washington Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government
(BBWR) is (in the view of the Polish immigrants) a condition for jobs, pensions, and posts.
Examples, examples!–the reader will demand at this point. I present some classic
examples below. Two high-ranking representatives of the Polish American Congress
participated in the ceremony of signing agreements between the Polish People’s Republic and
the USA at the Department of State in Washington. Those dignitaries affirmed with their
presence the legality of the Warsaw regime, following the loyalist principle that if the
American government deems the Warsaw regime as the legal government of Poland, there is
no reason why American Poland should think otherwise.
The celebration of the 500 th anniversary of the birth of Copernicus was held in
Washington under the patronage of the Polish American Congress. All Polish organisations
took part in the ceremony, including the Polish Combatants’ Association (SPK). Apart from
the SPK, however, the regime’s offices of LOT airlines and Cepelia also participated in the
edifying manifestation. Better still, the grand prize of the sweepstake was a free ticket for the
regime’s airline on the Washington-Warsaw route.
And the émigré London press naively insists on proclaiming that Nixon’s “détente”
doctrine is an illusion.
Our attitude towards the so-called West is astonishing. We approach the English and
the French with patronising disregard, and the émigré press is full of columns describing the
demise and decadence of the European West. Even publicists who were once associated with
socialism see nothing but “machinations of the communists” in the activity of British trade
unions.
Poles abroad extend complete support, however, to President Nixon, who is the closest
of the leaders of the Western world to the Polish antiliberal ideal of a right-wing saviour.
British prime minister, Edward Heath, even though a conservatist, is too liberal and,
even though progressive, too “socialist”. Being a solid democrat, he bears no resemblance to
the “strong-armed” leader of the Polish legend.
Unfortunately, as one of the leading publicists of London’s “Dziennik Polski” daily
stated with pathos–the liberals have stabbed Nixon in the back with the Watergate scandal.
Watergate is a mixture of gossip, depositions, and counter-depositions. One thing is
certain, however: the perpetrators of Watergate were the Republicans. How, then, could the
Republicans stab themselves in the back–this remains the secret of London’s “Dziennik
Polski”.
Of course, the BBWR never organised “electoral miracles”, and likewise, the
Republican party, being capitalist and right-wing, is–by definition–spotless. The liberals are
the ones to blame for everything, and 80 per cent of them are crypto-communists.
In this particular case, however, it is not about the political views of the older émigré
generation. It is about the complex of dancing to the master’s tune, which so often paralyses
the political action of the emigration.
We are going through a phase of mass strikes, mass marches, and mass protests. The
following matter has to be clarified completely. There is a conviction among the emigration
that nothing can be achieved through protests. This is partly true. Protests by the Jews in
relation to the “emigration tax” yielded a partial result, but this is undoubtedly an exception
rather than the rule. The absence of a protest, even one that is certain to fail, is understood by
international opinion as a surrender to the status quo.
In early June this year, during the conference of foreign ministers, Lithuanians,
Latvians, and Estonians, mostly with American passports, protested in the streets of Helsinki.
A correspondent of The Guardian noted that the Poles did not protest.
We must understand and remember that absence of a protest is also a political act with
a negative tone.
Had the Poles submitted a protest at the Helsinki Conference’s secretariat in four
heavy chests containing signatures of half a million Poles abroad, such a powerful gesture
would not achieve anything in the current-day, practical dimension, but it would become a
worldwide political and press sensation. We must also bear in mind that whatever is absent
from television screens and from newspapers does not exist.
A protest of this kind would make 33 ministers and the states they represent realise
that émigré Poles are serious about the line “Poland has not yet perished, as long as we still
live” from the Polish national anthem.
But who should organise the protests and political campaigns? Of course not those
dancing to Nixon’s tune, that is the members of the Washington and New York Nonpartisan
Bloc for Cooperation with the American Government.
It is not Americans’ fault that their country lies in the other hemisphere, and Poland’s
interests are not always aligned with those of the United States. It is a grave error, however, to
suppose that one could win over the Americans by supporting their policies even when they
clearly contradict the policy of Polish independence.
The United States may ease its relations with the Soviets because it is the world’s
greatest superpower. If the political emigration, however, were to seek “détente” or
collaboration with communist regimes, it would break the unspoken agreement between them
and the states that host us. The British granted the right of permanent residence to those
soldiers of the 2 nd Corps who refused to acknowledge the communist regime in Poland. The
matter was declared clearly and explicitly. This is an important point as it pertains to the
British government recognising us as political emigrants. I know for sure that the British
government expects an anti-communist attitude from all of us because it is as anti-communists
that we were granted the right to stay and considered as political émigrés.
The British government may lead one policy or another vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, but
this changes nothing about the nature of the Polish émigré. Even during the greatest détente, if
we began collaborating with regime institutions, if we organised Emigration-Cepelia
celebrations, the English would be very quick to tell us that we have unilaterally broken the
agreement that ensured our right of residence in the British Isles. And they would be
completely right. A Pole who endorses the PPR government and is buddies with the regime’s
foreign outposts is not entitled to the status of a political refugee and the related right of
permanent residence in England. The same applies to emigrants who have accepted foreign
citizenship. A de facto emigrant never ceases to be an emigrant because, unlike citizenship by
birth, citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be invalidated in court, and the ex-
naturalised citizen may be sentenced to deportation.
I am writing all this to put right those Poles–British, Canadian or American
citizens–who figure that it is their “mission” to actively participate in the détente politics
initiated by Nixon and Brezhnev.
Every Pole, whether or not he or she has accepted foreign citizenship, is a potential
security risk because Poland is not a NATO country but a member of the Warsaw Pact. To us,
old soldiers, this may seem tragicomic, but it is nonetheless a fact that there is a substantial
difference between a West German and a Pole who lives in London or New York. The
German is now a foreigner of allied nationality, as we were during World War II. A Pole
nowadays, however, is not of allied nationality because Poland is a member of a potentially
enemy group of countries.
Poles give this no thought, but British and American authorities, especially the
government departments responsible for security, never lose sight of these facts. This is why
even young Poles born in England often find it hard to get a position requiring a high-level
security clearance.
In summary, we should conclude as follows. Any Pole may return to Poland and
accept the citizenship of the PPR. Those emigrants, however, with or without foreign
passports, who seek direct contact with outposts of the regime, make an elementary mistake if
they imagine that they are acting on the détente policy and can, therefore, count on the
confidence and support of the governments of the countries where they have settled. In the
context of a war or a major crisis, those gentlemen will be the first on the list of foreigners or
citizens of foreign origin to be isolated and controlled as enemy aliens.
During the war I worked in Africa, in one of the outposts of the British Ministry of
Information and I had the opportunity of observing these matters up close. All articles in the
2nd Corps press were translated into English. I have reasons to believe that things are similar
nowadays. Emigrations from behind the Iron Curtain are too numerous and too politically
sensitive not to take an interest in them.
Let me repeat that every Pole in England or Canada is a potential security risk. A Pole
who maintains contacts with regime institutions, travels to Warsaw where his contacts are
difficult to trace, is obviously even more of a security risk because even if it is known what he
was when leaving, one never knows what he is on returning.
For people who went through World War II in active service, it is almost embarrassing
to write about this because these are the basics of behaviour towards a potential enemy. I have
devoted a lot of space to this because it seems to me that Poles of the middle-aged and young
generations who have not actively participated in the war ignore these basics and do not
remember that, détente or not, in government offices of London, Paris, or Washington, the
term “potential enemy power” always and exclusively refers to the Soviets and their allies.
This is why the basics also fully apply to those who do not remember this because they may
be in for a sorry surprise.
*
Before the war I never thought I was living in East Europe. Wawel, Saint Mary’s
Basilica with the Wit Stwosz altar and, above all, Kraków Market Square–all this had as much
to do with the East as with old Nuremberg. When I left for Vienna, Paris, or Berlin, I neither
thought nor said that I was travelling to the West. I just left to go abroad.
If someone had included Dresden among Eastern European cities before the war, such
a geographic classification would have caused an outburst of laughter.
The East was always Russia. Wherever Russian or Soviet rule reached, the East began.
At the end of World War II we began speaking and writing about the “betrayal of the
West”. Poland was arbitrarily included in the East, which for us seemed not only a disaster but
an absurdity. It was as if someone had incorporated Kraków into Canada under some kind of
treaty.
If someone left pre-war Kraków for Polesie–and you did meet eccentrics like
that–nobody said that those brave Cracovians are moving to the East. It was said that they
were leaving for the Borderlands (Pol.: Kresy).
When I returned to Kraków after a stay abroad of many weeks, I never had the
impression that I had arrived from one part of Europe to another separate part of Europe. In
Vienna people spoke German–but who in Kraków didn’t speak German? Things were a bit
different in Vienna, but it did not feel strange.
I have never lived in Warsaw. I would come to the capital city for a few days,
sometimes just for a few hours or so.
Warsaw gave me the impression of a Borderlands city. Not Lviv, which was properly
“Austrian”, but Warsaw. In the capital city, the proximity of the East was present and
palpable.
The West betrayed us in September 1939. Yalta was a consequence of that betrayal.
World War II could have been won in 1939–1940, and had the Germans had been conquered
without the participation of Russia, Yalta would not have happened.
The lessons to be drawn from September 1939 and Yalta should be understood as
follows: an accord with our neighbours in the East cannot be replaced by remote allies in the
West. Straightening relations with the Ukrainians, Belarussians, Lithuanians, and, further
down the line, with a non-imperialist Russia is a key precondition for Poland regaining and
solidifying its independence. Friendship with Western powers, however precious and needed,
will not replace the Eastern program.
If one has false dreams, one “dies by the betrayal of one’s dreams” to use the words of
Słowacki. The Western emigration myth assumes that one day, Washington will wake up and
the United States, together with a united Western Europe, will somehow push Russia away.
As is true for any myth, details are also irrelevant here: only the final fulfilment matters.
Russia’s defeat will erase and repair the harm done by the September Campaign and Yalta. An
independent Poland with Vilnius and Lviv will join the enlarged, united EEC, and Polish
divisions, equipped with American weapons, will guard our eastern borders. Thus, the
emigration’s myth will become a reality: Poland will return to the West.
Because of this false myth, we consider the United States and the Western powers to
be allies, which is the source of the complex of dancing to the master’s tune that was
discussed in the first part of this article.
What we fail to bear in mind, however, is that a possible breakup of the Soviet empire
will create conditions not just for Poland and the nations under the Russian yoke, but it will
also solve Germany’s problem. A new superpower will arise on the European continent: a
united Germany.
If we remain true to the emigration myth, at the moment of the perfect political
conditions we will find ourselves between the hostile nations of Eastern Europe and a
revisionist, superpower Germany. In a situation like that we will not find support in the West
for our claims regarding Lviv and Vilnius, and Germany–an ally of the Western powers–will
find support for their claims regarding Poland’s western regions.
We must not steer towards the classic situation of the partitions, i.e., we must not be in
conflict both with the East and with the West represented by the Germans.
We must choose between the East and the West, noting that the choice entails major
concessions on our part in both cases. Let me re-emphasise that the new situation will enable
the Germans to unify both German states.
If we do not straighten our relationships with the Ukrainians, if we make restorative
pretences regarding Lviv, the Ukrainians will seek support from Germany. We must pre-
emptively disarm the potential pro-German orientation of the Ukrainians. An independent
Ukraine, if it were to arise under the aegis of the Germans, would deteriorate rather than
improve Poland’s position. So from the Polish perspective, the Ukrainian problem overlaps
both the Eastern and Western programs of our politics.
We must not use the Ukrainian problem to blackmail Russia. We cannot–under the
circumstances–threaten the Russians that if they do not strike an accord with us, we will strike
an accord with the Ukrainians against them. This is because this kind of blackmail assumes
our waiver of the Ukrainian issue at the price of achieving an agreement with Russia.
As regards Germany, by stating that we consider Poland’s present eastern border of
Poland to be final, we make any potential Ukrainian pro-German attitude irrelevant.
Only this formula for Poland’s Ukrainian politics can ensure a benevolent attitude of
the future independent Ukraine towards Poland.
As its title suggests, this article is devoted to Poland’s Western politics in its core
tenets. Due to the geographical placement, our Western programme is dependent on the
Eastern program.
These deliberations are intended to make the reader aware of the fact that the historic
conditions we are looking forward to will bear no resemblance to the situation of 1918, even
though, as previously, the fall of the Russian empire in its present form must be an essential
component.
As a side note, I concur with The Economist that the Russians will have to either go
for a pre-emptive war against China in a relatively near future or give it up once and for all.
Within a decade, China will possess a retaliatory nuclear potential that it will be impossible to
destroy with one pre-emptive strike. In a few years’ time, when China achieves the capability
for retaliation, it will be impossible for such war to have a pre-emptive character: it would be
a Russian-Chinese nuclear war from the start. In other words, if the Russians want to protect
their cities from the prospect of Hiroshima while “denuclearising” China, they have to embark
on a pre-emptive war within the next several years.
I will analyse the above subject in one of my “Chinese” articles. It suffices here to say
that the “great stabilisation” of which Brezhnev and Nixon speak may end rather quickly, as
far as Russia is concerned. The president of the USA may keep a balance between Beijing and
Moscow, he may talk and trade both with the Soviets and with China. Brezhnev has no such
possibility and hence has no way to stabilise the Soviets’ position. Politics abhor unstable
situations and “instability” is always a prologue to so-called “great events”.
*
The English, French, and Americans would welcome a democratic government in
Warsaw. This does not mean that we can count on any help from the West. The French and
English certainly do not wish for Germany’s unification. For the Western powers, however,
the issue of Germany is different than it is for us. Even a united Germany can make no
territorial claims against France.
We have friends and sympathisers in the West who often understand the Polish issue
incorrectly–not in bad faith, but due to a lack of deeper comprehension because one fears
being accused of lacking realism.
Let us use the following example. Any medical treatment is a minimum program with
a maximum objective. If a doctor manages to reduce the fever of a typhoid patient even
slightly, it is a major success. But the objective of treatment is not a minimum improvement
but complete healing of the patient.
As we, likewise, cheerfully welcome even the slightest improvement of the situation in
Poland, we should not forget, and we should let others forget, that we have not given up on
the maximum objective of completely regaining independence.
There is nothing romantic, and especially nothing shameful in this. The English
consider maintaining the United Kingdom’s independence as basic and obvious realism and
they would be astounded if someone accused them of romanticism. In joining the EEC,
England has given up a part of its sovereignty. Sovereignty, however, is necessary even just to
be able to forsake a little fraction of it. In giving up a piece of its sovereignty, England gained
institutional influence, that is, a piece of sovereignty in the European Commission. As a
result, the United Kingdom has given up nothing; it merely exchanged a part of its sovereign
rights of one kind for partial sovereignty of another kind.
Poland and other satellite countries, on the other hand, have lost not a part but the
entirety of their sovereignty, gaining nothing in return.
In ceaselessly reminding the West that we have not given up on our maximum goals,
we are not acting in contradiction to the core principles of the Western civilisation even
though we may act in contradiction to the West’s current politics, as dictated by the demands
of the moment. In practical terms, what matters is always the current politics because it is on
the current politics that elections are won or lost. Restoring the independence of satellite
countries is a distant proposition, immeasurable in terms of political planning. Therefore, the
West will not risk the failure of its current politics by putting forward postulates whose
implementation would be welcome on the condition that they happen without effort or risk on
the part of the West.
If my predictions prove correct, the Soviet empire is doomed to fall in any case. If we
adopted the fantastic supposition that the Soviets would ingest all of Germany and incorporate
satellite states, the Kremlin would only magnify its nationality problem manyfold by reducing
the imperial nation, i.e., the Russians, to the status of a minority in its own superpower. Save
for a war with China, who knows if that would not be the shortest path leading to the collapse
of the Soviet empire. That is why the Russians will not do this. They are afraid of the Polish
influence, Polish culture, and Polish Roman Catholic nationalism; converting 33 million Poles
to actual Soviet citizens would be madness. The Russians will not do this because while
Soviet politicians do make mistakes, they do not resort to madness.
My intention was to write an article on Polish Westpolitik. In fact, it is impossible to
separate out a Western program in our situation. Our Western program will only be a success
if our Eastern program is a success. It is only when we manage to set our relationships with
the Eastern neighbours straight that we will be able to withstand the pressure of a united
Germany. France and England do not wish for a German superpower in the middle of Europe,
but Paris and London will support Poland on condition that Poland, with a regulated eastern
border, is a good bet.
No one will offer help or support to a Poland attempting to take away Lviv from
Ukrainians in the east and trying to defend Wroclaw in the west. In such a situation, the
West–in the name of order and peace–would only be a notary public, prepared to legalise yet
another one of our disasters.
Kultura 1974, no. 9/312
English translation by Piotr Sut
